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Mass Assignment Cheat Sheet ¶
Introduction ¶, definition ¶.
Software frameworks sometime allow developers to automatically bind HTTP request parameters into program code variables or objects to make using that framework easier on developers. This can sometimes cause harm.
Attackers can sometimes use this methodology to create new parameters that the developer never intended which in turn creates or overwrites new variable or objects in program code that was not intended.
This is called a Mass Assignment vulnerability.
Alternative Names ¶
Depending on the language/framework in question, this vulnerability can have several alternative names :
- Mass Assignment: Ruby on Rails, NodeJS.
- Autobinding: Spring MVC, ASP NET MVC.
- Object injection: PHP.
Example ¶
Suppose there is a form for editing a user's account information:
Here is the object that the form is binding to:
Here is the controller handling the request:
Here is the typical request:
And here is the exploit in which we set the value of the attribute isAdmin of the instance of the class User :
Exploitability ¶
This functionality becomes exploitable when:
- Attacker can guess common sensitive fields.
- Attacker has access to source code and can review the models for sensitive fields.
- AND the object with sensitive fields has an empty constructor.
GitHub case study ¶
In 2012, GitHub was hacked using mass assignment. A user was able to upload his public key to any organization and thus make any subsequent changes in their repositories. GitHub's Blog Post .
Solutions ¶
- Allow-list the bindable, non-sensitive fields.
- Block-list the non-bindable, sensitive fields.
- Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs).
General Solutions ¶
An architectural approach is to create Data Transfer Objects and avoid binding input directly to domain objects. Only the fields that are meant to be editable by the user are included in the DTO.
Language & Framework specific solutions ¶
Spring mvc ¶, allow-listing ¶.
Take a look here for the documentation.
Block-listing ¶
Nodejs + mongoose ¶, ruby on rails ¶, django ¶, asp net ¶, php laravel + eloquent ¶, grails ¶, play ¶, jackson (json object mapper) ¶.
Take a look here and here for the documentation.
GSON (JSON Object Mapper) ¶
Take a look here and here for the document.
JSON-Lib (JSON Object Mapper) ¶
Flexjson (json object mapper) ¶, references and future reading ¶.
- Mass Assignment, Rails and You
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The dangers of setattr: Avoiding Mass Assignment vulnerabilities in Python

February 15, 2023
Mass assignment, also known as autobinding or object injection, is a category of vulnerabilities that occur when user input is bound to variables or objects within a program.
Mass assignment vulnerabilities are often the result of an attacker adding unexpected fields to an object to manipulate the logic of a program. This was the cause of a famous GitHub authentication vulnerability , where mass assignment functionality in Ruby on Rails allowed an attacker to add their public key to the rails GitHub organization and push a commit to master.
This blog post was motivated, in part, by the Spring4Shell vulnerability , a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability caused by autobinding functionality included in the Spring framework. This prompted an exploration into whether a similar vulnerability could be found in the Python ecosystem.
In this post, we’ll examine the potential risks from Python’s setattr() function, and discuss ways to prevent Mass Assignment vulnerabilities in your application.
Introducing setattr
A commonly used way to implement mass assignment in Python is the inbuilt setattr() function. This function takes an object, attribute name, and attribute value, and sets the attribute of the object to the provided value. It is able to add new attributes as well as change existing ones.
Whilst convenient, allowing a user to set the value of any attribute in an object can have unintended consequences.
Firstly, it allows for traditional mass assignment logic vulnerabilities to arise in a program. Object fields that were not intended to be modified by a user can now be changed
Secondly, the attributes that can be modified with setattr are not limited to programmer-defined fields — both functions and inbuilt attributes such as __class__ and __dict__ can be set. Unlike the Spring4Shell vulnerability, setattr is unable to set nested child attributes of an object, limiting the scope of an attack. However, it is easy to cause an exception to be thrown at the point that setattr is called, by setting __class__ to a string value, or later during program execution by overwriting a function belonging to the object. Causing an exception to be thrown in this manner may result in abnormal program behavior or denial of service.
The code below is a small example that uses setattr to create a user. Running it with the input first_name=Sam,last_name=S will result in the output Sam S: Permission denied .
To cause the program to crash from an uncaught exception, the input first_name=Sam,last_name=S,is_admin=foo can be used — this will override the is_admin function, replacing it with a string and causing an exception to be thrown when the function is called.
The input first_name=Sam,last_name=S,admin=foo overrides the admin attribute of the User object with the string foo , because this is a Truthy value. When the is_admin function checks the admin attribute, the user is treated as an admin and Sam S: You are admin! is output.
Preventing Mass Assignment
A general strategy for mitigating mass assignment vulnerabilities is to keep objects containing user input separate from the objects responsible for internal program logic. This is done by creating Data Transfer Objects (DTOs), which only contain the fields that a user is able to set. In Python, this is easy to do using dataclasses . The following code shows how a DTO can be used to define allowed fields explicitly. If incorrect fields are specified, a TypeError is raised — which is then caught and handled, preventing the attacks mentioned above.
Validating the user input is also a way to prevent mass assignment vulnerabilities. As always, it's better to validate using a list of approved data rather than checking for data that is forbidden. The following code still uses setattr but checks the attribute name against a list of allowed attributes.
It’s always best to be explicit with what user input a program expects, but if you need to be more flexible with the handling of user input there are alternatives to the setattr function. The collections module in the Python standard library provides two useful classes to help — collections.UserDict and collections.abc.MutableMapping . These classes can be inherited from in order to provide extra functionality to key/value mappings. If you need to access values via attributes rather than keys, this can be achieved by implementing a __getattr__ method on your class. In the example below, the User class behaves like a dictionary and is able to store any fields provided by the user. By overriding __getattr__ , when an attribute is accessed that can not be found as part of the usual mechanism for accessing an attribute, it is instead returned from the dictionary of user-supplied fields. This allows the user-supplied fields to be accessed in the same manner as attributes, but prevents attributes belonging to the class from being overridden by user input.
Protecting your Python libraries
Weighing security against convenience and flexibility can be difficult in the height of software development. Something that seems benign on the surface, can expose you and your application to a variety of security risks — which is why education and alternative methods are so important. We’ve discussed how setattr works and the dangers of relying on it in your Python libraries, as well as several ways to prevent Mass Assignment vulnerabilities. With this knowledge, you’re well on your way to protecting your Python applications from attacks and data breaches. To learn more, head over to our homepage and create your free account or book a demo to see how Snyk can help protect your code, containers, dependencies, and cloud infrastructure.
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- Mass Assignment
What is a Mass Assignment Attack?
In order to reduce the work for developers, many frameworks provide convenient mass-assignment functionality. This lets developers inject an entire set of user-entered data from a form directly into an object or database. Without it, developers would be forced to tediously add code specifically for each field of data, cluttering the code base with repeated form mapping code.
The downside of this functionality is that it is often implemented without a whitelist that prevents users from assigning data to protected fields. An attacker may exploit this vulnerability to gain access to sensitive data or to cause data loss.
As demonstrated by prominent cases , even the best teams of developers can miss this non-obvious vulnerability.
An Example of a Vulnerability
In this example, a web shop allows users to sign up and keep track of their orders. The owner of the web shop has a special administrator account that allows them to manage other users and their orders. The administrator account is created in the database, just like a regular user account, except it has an is_administrator flag set.
On the sign up page, the user is asked to enter their email address and select a password:
The corresponding controller action creates the user in the database:
An attacker may inject their own HTML into form (or otherwise modify the request):
The controller action will create the user, letting the attacker gain complete control of the web shop:
How To Defend Against Mass Assignment Attacks
In the example above, the developer should change the code to either explicitly assign the attributes for the allowed fields, or use a whitelisting function provided by the framework (Ruby on Rails in this case):
More useful information may be found at:
- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mass_Assignment_Cheat_Sheet
- http://guides.rubyonrails.org/v3.2.9/security.html#mass-assignment
- https://laravel.com/docs/5.0/eloquent#mass-assignment
- https://odetocode.com/Blogs/scott/archive/2012/03/11/complete-guide-to-mass-assignment-in-asp-net-mvc.aspx
- https://coffeeonthekeyboard.com/mass-assignment-security-part-10-855/
- https://nvisium.com/resources/blog/2014/01/17/insecure-mass-assignment-prevention.html
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Home » Cybersecurity » DevOps » API Security 101: Mass Assignment

API Security 101: Mass Assignment
With one click, you are the admin: Mass assignments and their threats to API data integrity.
You’ve probably heard of the OWASP top ten or the top ten vulnerabilities that threaten web applications. OWASP also periodically selects a list of top ten vulnerabilities that threaten APIs, called the OWASP API top ten. The current API top ten are Broken Object Level Authorization , Broken User Authentication , Excessive Data Exposure , Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting , Broken Function Level Authorization , Mass Assignment , Security Misconfiguration , Injection , Improper Assets Management , and Insufficient Logging & Monitoring .
The vulnerability we will talk about today is OWASP API #6, Mass Assignment. “Mass assignment” refers to the practice of assigning values to multiple variables or object properties all at once. But how could this feature cause security vulnerabilities? Let’s explore by taking a look at an example object.

Object properties
Application objects often have many properties that describe the object. For instance, let’s say a “user” object is used to store user information in your application. It contains properties that describe the user like the user’s ID, name, location, and so on.
In this case, users should be able to modify some of these properties stored in their objects, like the location and name properties. But other parts of this user object should be restricted from the user, such as the “admin” property, which denotes whether the user is an admin, and the “group_membership” property, which records which user groups the user is a member of.
Mass assignment
Mass assignment vulnerabilities happen when the application automatically assigns user input to multiple program variables or objects. This is a feature in many application frameworks designed to simplify application development.
But this feature sometimes allows attackers to overwrite, modify, or create new program variables or object properties at will. For instance, let’s say the site allows users to change their names via a PUT request like this one. This request will update the name of the user 12345 from “Vickie” to “Vickie Li”.
Now, what if a malicious user submitted this request instead?
If the application uses mass assignment to automatically update the properties of the user object, this request would update the “admin” field of the object as well, and grant the user 12345 admin privileges. This is what a mass assignment vulnerability looks like.
Similarly, the malicious user might be able to add themselves to private user groups by assigning themselves to new groups using the endpoint.
To prevent mass assignments, you can disable the mass assignment feature with the framework you are using, or use a whitelist to only allow assignment on certain properties or variables.
What other security concepts do you want to learn about? I’d love to know. Feel free to connect on Twitter @vickieli7 .
Want to learn more about application security? Take our free OWASP top ten courses here: https://www.shiftleft.io/learn/ .
API Security 101: Mass Assignment was originally published in ShiftLeft Blog on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.
*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from ShiftLeft Blog - Medium authored by Vickie Li . Read the original post at: https://blog.shiftleft.io/api-security-101-mass-assignment-31060f7ee80e?source=rss----86a4f941c7da---4
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API Mass Assignment Vulnerability
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API Mass Assignment
Mass assignment vulnerabilites occur when a user is able to initialize or overwrite server-side variables for which are not intended by the application. By manually crafting a request to include additional parameters in a request, a malicious user may adversely affect application functionality.
Common root causes of mass assignment vulnerabilities may include the following:
Framework-level “autobinding” features. Spring and .NET MVC are two of many frameworks that allow HTTP parameters to be directly mapped to model objects. While this feature is useful to easily set server-side values, it does not prevent arbitrary parameters from being injected.
- https://agrrrdog.blogspot.com/2017/03/autobinding-vulns-and-spring-mvc.html
Parsing a request body as an object. Although copying an object is easier than selecting numerous individual values within that object, this practice should be avoided. When using data formats such as JSON, developers should only extract values that are intended to be modified by users.
Below shows a common example of this vulnerability in a user registration endpoint: POST /api/register HTTP/1.1 [..] {“email”:”[email protected]”}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [..] {”userid”:”112345”,“email”:”[email protected]”,”email_verified”:false}
A malicious user may want to bypass email verification for a number of reasons. To attack this endpoint, a value is inserted into the request body:
POST /api/register HTTP/1.1 [..] {“email”:”[email protected]”,”email_verified”:true}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [..] {”userid”:”112346”,“email”:”[email protected]”,”email_verified”:true}
Developers should also ensure that values do not include nested objects or arrays which may undermine application logic. Below shows another style of attack leveraging JSON arrays:
POST /api/register HTTP/1.1 [..] {“email”:[”[email protected]”,”[email protected]”]}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [..] {”userid”:”112347”,“email”:[”[email protected]”,”[email protected]”],”email_verified”:false}
In the above example an array is provided where a single string value was expected. This would likely have significant security implications for account access and associations.
- Application

- Dec 13, 2022
Mass Assignment 101
In this blog post, we'll take a look at what mass assignment attacks are, how they work, and why it's important for businesses and organizations to be aware of them. We'll also discuss some best practices for preventing mass assignment attacks and protecting your API from this type of threat. By understanding mass assignment attacks and taking steps to prevent them, you can help to keep your API and your business secure.
What is a Mass Assignment attack?
A mass assignment attack is a type of security vulnerability that occurs when an attacker is able to modify the values of multiple object's properties by passing them in as part of an HTTP request. This is typically done in bulk where multiple objects are changed at once using attack automation tooling.
This can allow the attacker to set the values of sensitive properties, such as passwords or security permissions, without the proper authorization which can result in significant risk exposure, exfiltration of data, or data loss.
Mass assignment attacks are often made possible by insufficient input validation or the lack of an object-level access control mechanism. For example, if an application allows users to submit an HTTP request with a JSON or XML payload that includes all of the properties of an object, an attacker may be able to manipulate the values of these properties in order to gain unauthorized access or permissions.
Here's an example of an API vulnerable to Mass Assignment attack:
In this example, the create_user endpoint accepts a JSON object containing the user's username and password. It then creates a User object using the data from the request and saves it to the database.
However, this code is vulnerable to a mass assignment attack, because it allows an attacker to specify arbitrary attributes for the User object by including them in the JSON object that is sent in the request. For example, an attacker could add an admin attribute to the JSON object, and the User object would be created with that attribute set to true, giving the attacker administrator access to the system.
Why you need to know about Mass Assignment
Mass assignment attacks are a type of vulnerability that can affect APIs, and are a serious concern for businesses and organizations. These attacks can allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data, or to take control of the API and perform actions that they should not be able to. This can have serious consequences for the business, such as data breaches, loss of customer trust, and financial losses.
In addition to the direct impact on the business, mass assignment attacks can also have indirect effects. For example, if an attacker is able to take control of an API, they may be able to use it to launch other attacks, such as denial of service attacks or injection attacks. This can have even wider-reaching consequences for the business, and can cause significant damage to the organization's reputation and bottom line.
How to prevent mass assignment attacks
To prevent mass assignment attacks, it is important to properly validate user input and implement object-level access controls to ensure that only authorized users can modify the values of sensitive properties. This can include restricting the properties that can be modified in an HTTP request, as well as verifying the user's permissions before allowing them to make any changes.
One way to prevent your API from being attacked by a mass assignment attack is to validate and sanitize your API inputs. use an input validation and sanitization tool. This approach can help you ensure that only authorized parameters are accepted by your API, and that any potentially harmful input is sanitized or rejected. However, this type of solution can be difficult to implement in real life and is best supplemented with other approaches as well.
Another way to prevent mass assignment attacks is to use an API runtime protection tool that provides built-in protection against mass assignment attacks. An runtime protection tool acts as a layer of protection between your API and the outside world, and can help prevent unauthorized or malicious requests from reaching your API. Unfortunately, most runtime protection tools (like WAFs or API Gateways) lack the intelligence to recognize mass assignment attacks.
Another way to prevent mass assignment attacks is to use a whitelist-based approach to parameter validation. This means only allowing specific, authorized parameters to be accepted by your API, and rejecting any other input. This approach is sometimes referred to as implementing a positive security model.
Additionally, you can use a combination of these approaches to provide a more robust defense against mass assignment attacks. By using input validation and sanitization tools, a runtime protection solution, and a whitelist-based approach, you can help protect your API from mass assignment attacks and other threats. Bringing all of these approaches together in a seamless solution is the best path forward and what we're building at Impart Security.
Overall, it's important for businesses and organizations to be aware of mass assignment attacks and to take steps to prevent them. By understanding this type of attack and implementing appropriate safeguards, you can help to keep your API and your business secure.
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API6:2019 - Mass Assignment
Is the api vulnerable.
Objects in modern applications might contain many properties. Some of these properties should be updated directly by the client (e.g., user.first_name or user.address ) and some of them should not (e.g., user.is_vip flag).
An API endpoint is vulnerable if it automatically converts client parameters into internal object properties, without considering the sensitivity and the exposure level of these properties. This could allow an attacker to update object properties that they should not have access to.
Examples for sensitive properties:
- Permission-related properties : user.is_admin , user.is_vip should only be set by admins.
- Process-dependent properties : user.cash should only be set internally after payment verification.
- Internal properties : article.created_time should only be set internally by the application.
Example Attack Scenarios
Scenario #1.
A ride sharing application provides a user the option to edit basic information for their profile. During this process, an API call is sent to PUT /api/v1/users/me with the following legitimate JSON object:
The request GET /api/v1/users/me includes an additional credit_balance property:
The attacker replays the first request with the following payload:
Since the endpoint is vulnerable to mass assignment, the attacker receives credits without paying.
Scenario #2
A video sharing portal allows users to upload content and download content in different formats. An attacker who explores the API found that the endpoint GET /api/v1/videos/{video_id}/meta_data returns a JSON object with the video’s properties. One of the properties is "mp4_conversion_params":"-v codec h264" , which indicates that the application uses a shell command to convert the video.
The attacker also found the endpoint POST /api/v1/videos/new is vulnerable to mass assignment and allows the client to set any property of the video object. The attacker sets a malicious value as follows: "mp4_conversion_params":"-v codec h264 && format C:/" . This value will cause a shell command injection once the attacker downloads the video as MP4.
How To Prevent
- If possible, avoid using functions that automatically bind a client’s input into code variables or internal objects.
- Whitelist only the properties that should be updated by the client.
- Use built-in features to blacklist properties that should not be accessed by clients.
- If applicable, explicitly define and enforce schemas for the input data payloads.
- CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

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Attackers can sometimes use this methodology to create new parameters that the developer never intended which in turn creates or overwrites new variable or objects in program code that was not intended. This is called a Mass Assignment vulnerability. Alternative Names
Mass assignment, also known as autobinding or object injection, is a category of vulnerabilities that occur when user input is bound to variables or objects within a program. Mass assignment vulnerabilities are often the result of an attacker adding unexpected fields to an object to manipulate the logic of a program.
“Mass assignment” refers to the practice of assigning values to multiple variables or object properties all at once. But how could this feature cause security vulnerabilities? Let’s explore by taking a look at an example object. Object properties Application objects often have many properties that describe the object.
What is a Mass Assignment Attack? In order to reduce the work for developers, many frameworks provide convenient mass-assignment functionality. This lets developers inject an entire set of user-entered data from a form directly into an object or database.
“Mass assignment” refers to the practice of assigning values to multiple variables or object properties all at once. But how could this feature cause security vulnerabilities? Let’s explore by taking a look at an example object. Object properties Application objects often have many properties that describe the object.
API Mass Assignment It is a severe API threat that arises when you save the request body as it is on the server instead of getting values from it one by one. It allows the user to initialize or overwrite server-side variables that the application does not intend.
Mass assignment vulnerabilites occur when a user is able to initialize or overwrite server-side variables for which are not intended by the application. By manually crafting a request to include additional parameters in a request, a malicious user may adversely affect application functionality.
A mass assignment attack is a type of security vulnerability that occurs when an attacker is able to modify the values of multiple object's properties by passing them in as part of an HTTP request. This is typically done in bulk where multiple objects are changed at once using attack automation tooling.
API6:2019 - Mass Assignment Is the API Vulnerable? Objects in modern applications might contain many properties. Some of these properties should be updated directly by the client (e.g., user.first_name or user.address) and some of them should not (e.g., user.is_vip flag).